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ABSTRACT
Authentication and authorization to online sites is a difficult problem to solve without the use
of cryptography. The standard method of using passwords is clearly an insecure method of
authentication. A method of authenticating users utilizing a Latin square was developed by a
security enthusiast and touted as secure. This paper demonstrates a novel method of cracking
the Latin squares that are used to generate the secure passwords in the Off The Grid (OTG)
password management scheme. Our method leverages the cores on Graphics Processing Unit
(GPU) using the Compute Unified Device Architecture (CUDA) programming extension to
efficiently solve the Latin squares used in the OTG password management solution. We
developed a model that represents the possible states and the constraints of the OTG system.
We show that the OTG system leaks information about its Latin square and we provide
supporting evidence through examples and computation.
Keywords: Parallel Computing, Passwords, Latin Squares, GPU, CUDA, Authentication,
Access Control, Cloud Security
1. INTRODUCTION
The use of passwords has become a typical
method of authentication for users of digi-
tal systems for the past 30 years. This use
was spawned out of the original Unix sys-
tems, where users shared the resources of a
multi-user system. During the rise of the In-
ternet, these password-based systems were
thrust upon users of websites. Users were
either given an easy to remember password
or they were allowed to choose their own
password for authentication. Websites are
then responsible for storing the secret pass-
word that user will use to authenticate to
the server. In the early days, websites would
store the password in plain text and simply
compare the password on the server with the
password that the user entered when authen-
ticating.
Attackers have had the ability to gain
unauthorized access to Internet connected
computer systems as long as computers have
been connected to the network. When an
attacker gains access to a website that has
passwords stored in plain text, then that at-
tacker can then easily authenticate as any
user of the system. The loss of a single pass-
word from a single website should not give
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the attacker access to a different website,
except when the user uses the same pass-
word for both sites. With the growth in the
number of websites that are used for normal
day-to-day activities, users do not maintain
a unique password for every site.
To thwart password re-use attacks, web-
site maintainers have migrated from stor-
ing plaintext passwords to storing hashes of
passwords. When a user selects a new pass-
word, the website will hash the password us-
ing one of the secure hashing algorithms, like
MD5, SHA256 or SHA512. When the user
authenticates at a later time, the website
will compute the hash of the given password
with the hash that is stored in the database.
If they match, it is highly likely that the
user has the correct password. If an attacker
can exfiltrate the database of passwords then
they can try and crack those passwords of-
fline. Cracking a hashed password means
that the attacker will have to guess the pass-
word. They can either use brute force, and
guess every possible password of a specific
length, or they can use rules based on human
behavior to guess passwords. Either method
increases the difficulty for the attacker to be
able to take a password from one website and
use it on a different website.
In the creation of public key cryptogra-
phy has raised the bar for authenticating
users (SSH Communications Security, 2018).
Users can generate and save a public/pri-
vate key pair for authentication purposes.
They can then store and share a public key
on a server. If the security of the server
is compromised, then no secret informa-
tion is lost. This method of authentication
is extremely difficult to attack, compared
to attacking password based authentication
methods used by typical websites.
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)
is a standards body that creates standards
for the Internet and websites. They have
created standards for Web commerce, Web
Payments and the Web Of Things(W3C,
2019). The W3C has defined the WebAu-
thn standard(W3C, 2018) for allowing access
to hardware devices from Internet websites.
These hardware devices provide the ability
for a user to authenticate with a website,
without sharing private information to the
website. The YubiKey(YubiKey, 2018) is an
example of a hardware device that can be
accessible to websites through the WebAu-
thN standard. The YubiKey has the ability
to use the FIDO2 protocol(Alliance, 2018)
to authenticate website users. With FIDO2,
a device can generate a random asymmet-
ric public/private key pair. The device can
then provide the public key as a method of
authentication for the user. The device has
the ability to prove that the user possesses
the private key, without exposing the pri-
vate key to the website. Thus, the website
does not have any secrets to store. The same
public key can be used for multiple websites,
without exposing a sensitive key to multiple
parties.
During the past two decades, attackers
and computer scientists have been lever-
aging the GPU to do more than process-
ing graphics. The parallel nature of ren-
dering graphics has lead to a vast in-
crease in the number of cores on a graph-
ics card. In 2009 graphics cards had 8
cores and by 2017 a high end graphics card
has nearly 4000 cores(Wikipedia, 2018a)
(Galloy, 2018). Figure 1 shows the vast in-
crease in GPU cores over the past decade.
This vast increase in computing power by
graphics cards has lead to their use for
other purposes. Such examples include
the solving of compute intensive paralleliz-
able tasks, such as the simulation of bio-
chemical molecules(NVIDIA, 2018-05), ma-
chine learning (NVIDIA, 2018-04) and the
cracking of password hashes. The Hash-
cat program (Hashcat, 2018-05) is a pass-
word cracking program that can utilize ei-
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ther a CPU and/or a GPU to crack password
hashes. Hashcat has the ability to use either
Figure 1. GPU Cores by Year
brute force attacks, dictionary attacks or a
combination of the the two. If an attacker
has the ability to acquire a password hash
stored on a website, then they can attempt
to crack that password. There are two stan-
dard methods that a website can use to hash
a password. The first is to run the password
through a secure hashing algorithm. Then
when the website attempts to authenticate
the user, it will hash the password provided
by the user and see if the hashes match. The
problem with this method, is that if multi-
ple users use the same password, then their
passwords hashes will be exactly the same.
Thus the attacker will only need to attack
each hash once for all the users. To make at-
tacks harder, websites are encouraged to salt
their passwords. With salted hashes, each
user of a website has a unique salt stored on
the website(Wikipedia, 2108). The website
then concatenates the salt with the password
and then hashes the concatenated string and
stores the salted hash. The stored salted
hash will be different for every user, even
if those users have the same password (each
user has a unique salt). Thus, the attacker
will have to attack each salted hash, which
will more difficult than attacking unsalted
password hashes.
2. BACKGROUND
The OTG password scheme was developed
by Steve Gibson of Gibson Research Corpo-
ration (GRC). The description of the system
is located on its project page(Gibson, 2018).
He has designed security systems such as the
Shields Up port scanner, a Spectre and Melt-
down detector and a DNS benchmark tool.
The OTG system is designed to be printed
onto paper and then used off line(thus the
name).
The OTG password system works by gen-
erating a 26x26 Latin Square. A Latin
Square is a NxN matrix where every row
and every column have exactly one value
from 1 to N. The popular Sudoku puzzles
are a more restrictive instance of a Latin
square. The OTG password system gener-
ates a 26x26 Latin square where every cell
contains a single letter of the alphabet. Ev-
ery OTG square generated by the GRC web-
site is randomly generated. An OTG user
will then print their unique square for use
in generating passwords. The OTG website
provides directions for the users to use the
OTG algorithm, which we will briefly de-
scribe below.
2.1 Off The Grid Usage
After the user has created and printed a
grid, they are ready to start generating pass-
words for websites. The first step is to trace
through the grid to locate your starting lo-
cation. Figure 2 shows an illustration of
tracing the amazon.com domain through the
grid. The user locates the “A” (first letter
of Amazon) in the very top row of the grid.
They then locate the next letter of the do-
main “m” and find its location in the same
column as the beginning “A” was located.
The next letter is Amazon is an “a”. The
user switches directions and moves horizon-
tally in the same row as the “m” to locate the
next “a” in that row. This process continues
c© 2019 ADFSL Page 3
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until the user has traced through the entire
domain. We will call this location where the
user finishes tracing the domain the start-
ing point. The starting point is then used
to generate the password for the website at
that domain.
Figure 2. Tracing through the grid
After the user has located the starting
point they then trace through the grid to
generate the password. An interesting note,
is that the starting location is the last letter
of the domain name. The user then locates
the starting letter in the domain name. In
our example, the user ended at the “n” in
Amazon and now they will locate the start-
ing “A” in the same row. This example is
illustrated in Figure 3. After the user has
located the “A” in that row the first 2 char-
acters of the password are generated. In this
example the “A” is followed by a “gc”. The
OTG system defines that first to letters of
the users password are now “gc”. The user
then continues tracking the domain, starting
at the ending letter of “c” and they switch
from moving horizontally to moving verti-
cally. They then locate the next letter in
the domain which in this case is the “m” in
Amazon. The next two letters of the pass-
word are the two letters that follow the “m”
in in that column, which is “nz” in this ex-
ample. This process continues until the user
has traced through the entire domain name.
In this example the password for Amazon is
“gcznegmacmzg”.
Figure 3. Generating a password
2.2 Special Cases
There are a few special cases that occur in
the OTG system. Case 1 is when tracing
the grid, the user can reach a letter that is
at the edge of the grid. The user then can
use the “overshoot” method to wrap around
the grid. Figure 4 shows how the genera-
tion of a password can wrap around the the
grid. Case 2 is when the domain has two
consecutive letters in a row (aka Facebook).
The OTG website does not specify how to
handle this case, but for this case we assume
that the user generates two letters to either
side of the letters in the same row or column
(depending on the current direction of the
trace).
Figure 4. Wrapping Case
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3. ATTACKING GRIDS
When attacking the OTG system we assume
that there are websites that have OTG pass-
words leaked. The OTG author assumes
that if the passwords to a set of websites
are leaked, then the security of other web-
sites will not be affected. Our assumption
is that there exists a set of passwords that
are leaked. In particular, we will have a pair
of inputs, the leaked websites domain name
and the leaked password, we coin this in-
formation a Domain Name Password (DNP)
pair.
The simplest method to attack the OTG
would be to try and generate all possible
Latin squares. But as the OTG website
states, there are 9.337 x 10426 possible Latin
squares. This type of attack would be infea-
sible to use. Thus a more targeted approach
is needed, if this system can be attacked.
Figure 5. Example password Generation
We started with the information that we
can glean from the password generation algo-
rithm. We will assume that we are starting
with a single users Latin square. In Figure
5 we can see that when a user generates a
password using the domain name, the last
letter of the domain is followed by the first
letter of the domain name. Additionally, we
know that the first two letters of the pass-
word immediately follow the first letter of
the domain name. Figure 6 shows the re-
strictions on the passwords that are gener-
ated. To indicate the restrictions on a Latin
square the arrow notation will be used. if
A→ BCD is shown, that will mean that A
is followed by zero or more characters in a
row and the symbols BCD will be consecu-
tive in the users Latin square. Consecutive
characters will adhere to the wrap around ef-
fect mentioned in Section 2.2 and thus BCD
are logically consecutive. In the example in
Figure 5 we know that N → AGC is a re-
striction on all valid Latin squares that could
generate the password for this domain name.
Figure 6. Latin Square Restrictions
A second example that restricts the num-
ber of Latin square is in the wrap around
effect that can occur (Section 2.2). It is pos-
sible both letters from the domain name to
be on the edge of the grid. If this is the
case, then the wrap around will include the
original letter in the domain name. Figure
7 will illustrate this issue. Suppose the we
are starting in column 1 on the letter “A”.
The next letter in the domain is the “M”
which is in column N (or the last column of
a NxN grid). Due to the wrap around rule
the restriction generated will be A→MAB
and thus we know that A and M are on the
border of the grid. This restriction severally
limits the number of possible grids that can
create this domain name password combina-
tion. In this example there are only 2 possi-
ble locations for the letter A and M (in that
row). There can also exist the combination
of A → MBA, where the starting domain
letter is the last letter in the restriction. In
this case there are 4 possible locations for
the restriction to be located.
Figure 7. Wrap Around Condition
In addition to the restrictions above we
also can glean information from the chain
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of restrictions. Each step in the generation
of the password will leak information about
the set of possible Latin squares. In Fig-
ure 3 we have the restriction of N → AGC.
We also know that the column of the letter
“C” is the starting point for the restriction
C → MZN . This process repeats for the
entire chain of the password. Additionally,
we observed that domain names that contain
an even number of characters, will initially
start generating passwords where the user is
moving horizontally through the grid. If the
domain name has an odd number of char-
acters, then the user will start by moving
vertically through the grid to generate pass-
words.
3.1 Testing Model
Our approach is to start with Latin squares
of a size where there is a known exact num-
ber of Latin squares possible. For our tests,
we started by using Latin squares of size
10. To represent domains and passwords
the letters A-J will be used. For a 10x10
Latin square there are 9.98 x 1036 possible
total squares(Wikipedia, 2018b). We chose
a random Latin square to use as the base for
which to generate passwords from (known as
grid0). After the initial Latin square was
generated, a set of random domain names
was created. For each of the domain names
the process described in Section 2.1 was used
to generate the password for that domain us-
ing grid0. The domain name and password
pairs are stored in a plain text file. For this
project we generated a random set of 12,288
DNP pairs.
4. LEVERAGING
CUDA
The original solutions to solve this prob-
lem were written using multi-threading in
the Java language. Java is a compiled lan-
guage, but the speed of operation for a Java
program is significantly slower than running
the same program in the C language. Ad-
ditionally , typical computing systems have
between 4 and 24 different cores that can
run in parallel. Due to these limitations, the
prior implementations were not very efficient
at solving the Latin squares.
With the prolific rise in the number of
cores that can be integrated onto a single
GPU the design of the project focused on
designing a system that would be able to
leverage a high number of cores. The current
design requires at least 840 cores for the ini-
tial phase, but this number is configurable.
This number is based off of the number of
possible grids that are generated by a sin-
gle brute force attack on a 10 x 10 Latin
square. Additionally we focused on develop-
ing a CUDA based application, which runs
on an Nvidia graphics card. CUDA is an ex-
tension of the C programming language that
allows a developer to write classic C code,
with the ability to write code that runs on
a GPU. CUDA allows the programmer to
define code that is run on the host machine
(CPU) and on the device GPU. There is an
interface provided by CUDA that allows host
code to interact with the device. CUDA also
provides a mapping between RAM and the
device memory. This allows the host and the
device to seamlessly synchronize and trans-
fer data. The CUDA drivers take care of the
actual copying of data over the bus that con-
nect the host machine to the graphics device.
4.1 CUDA Implementation
Issues
CUDA has the advantage of having a vast
number of raw cores that can be leveraged
by an application. This does come at the
cost of having a much lower amount RAM
that can be accessed by the graphics card.
Typical cards have the ability to address be-
tween 4 and 8 gigabytes of RAM. This is con-
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trast to the fact that CPU’s can access to an
excess of 128 gigabytes of RAM. The initial
designs of the CUDA software were designed
recursively. The depth of the recursion was
only a few hundred calls deep, but this type
of design would crash the CUDA software.
The design was then switched to maintain
the state in RAM. The RAM is maintaining
by using the CUDA Unified Memory Model.
This model allows the programmer to allo-
cate memory in both host and device lev-
els, and then synchronization is implemented
by the compiler and provided by the CUDA
driver software.
The implementation of the system also
had to take into account that a minimal
amount of state could be saved between.
The limited amount of RAM available to the
GPU forced a depth first approach to solving
the Latin squares. The state was stored for
all the previous computations as if the sys-
tem were implemented recursively, but with-
out the overhead of calling functions.
4.2 Implementation Details
The starting point of the software was to
read in the domain name and the password
associated with that domain name. This
data was then converted from text to a
linked list data structure shown in Listing
1. This structure holds a single restriction
A → BCD in a compact form. The integer
representation of the characters are stored
in the letters array. The direction character
stores if the restriction is either a horizontal
restriction or vertical restriction. The Path
structure is a linked list, where each restric-
tion points to either the next restriction, or
points to NULL if it is last last one in the
list. This data structure is created one time
during the reading of the DNP pairs from
the file.
Listing 1. Path Structure
typedef struct Path
{
struct Path ∗ next ;
char d i r e c t i o n ;
int l e t t e r s [ 4 ] ;
char ∗ domain ;
char ∗ pass ;
} Path ;
The grid structure stores the information
about the state of the grid, given the path
restrictions. It is shown in Listing 2. The
grid maintains a N x N array of characters
that represent the ASCII character that is
at the current location. If the character is
unknown, then a sentinel dash character (-
) is stored in cell. This allows the grid to
be printed to the console in a easy to read
format. The ok variable stores the result of
if the grid has any errors, when trying to
set a character at a particular location. The
error occurs when either 1) there is already
a different character in that location or 2)
that character is already in the current row
or column. This can occur for any of the 3
characters when a path is being traced.
One of the major optimizations that oc-
curred when developing this implementation
was the use of bit vectors to store the in-
formation about the letters in the rows and
columns. For example suppose that the pro-
gram decides that a “C” should set in Row 1,
Column 7. A simple implementation would
store the fact that “C” could not be in any
cell in Row 1, as well as any Cell in Column
7. For a NxN grid, this would require ei-
ther a list in every cell N elements for NxN
cells or it would require a bit vector for ev-
ery cell NxN . These solutions either take up
a relatively large amount of space (on the
space limited GPU) or time to go through
every row and column to check the restric-
tions. The optimized solution was to use
a single bit vector for every row and every
column. This required 2N amount of stor-
age for a NxN grid. If the system tries “C”
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should set in Row 1, Column 7, then “C” is
removed from the Row 1 bit vector and the
Column 7 bit vector. Each letter is repre-
sented by using a bit mask where each letter
is 2N where N is the ordinal value of the let-
ter in the alphabet. Thus A is 20 = 1, B
is 21 = 2 and C is 22 = 4 and so on and
so forth. As the maximum size for a Latin
square in the OTG system has 26 cells, a sin-
gle 32 bit integer can be used to store the bit
vector. This representation allows system to
set the restrictions in O(2) time and it uses
O(2N) space to store these restrictions. The
implementation uses bitwise or to add a new
restriction and bitwise and to check for the
existence of a restriction. These restrictions
are stored in the grid using the row and col
fields of the grid structure.
Listing 2. Grid Structure
typedef struct Grid
{
int ∗row ;
int ∗ c o l ;
char ∗∗ C e l l s ;
char ok ;
} Grid ;
The location data structure is used to
store information about where the system is
guessing a restriction will go within a grid.
This data structure is shown in Listing 3.
The x and y variables are used to store where
the first letter in a restriction is supposed to
be located. In the example A → BCD the
letter “A” is located at (x,y) within the grid.
The type field in the location structure can
either be Full or Partial. A Full search type
is used to go through every combination of x
and y coordinates. This is used for the first
restriction within a path. The Full search
type is used to generate the primer for the
grids. A full search on a 10x10 grid, that
does not have any special case restrictions,
generates 840 possible grids. Each of these
grids is then distributed to a different core
on the GPU during subsequent calls. The
rest of the restrictions of the path will all be
be partial locations. A full is also used when
the next DNP pair is searched.
For both the Full and Partial, the system
uses the direction in the path (Listing 1) to
determine how nextX and nextY are incre-
mented. For the Partial path, if the restric-
tion in horizontal, then nextY and y will
remain constant through the loop and the
nextX value will increment through the loop
from index 1 to N .
Listing 3. Location Structure
typedef struct Locat ion
{
u i n t 8 t x ;
u i n t 8 t y ;
u i n t 8 t nextX ;
u i n t 8 t nextY ;
u i n t 8 t lastX ;
u i n t 8 t lastY ;
u i n t 8 t type ;
u i n t 8 t edge ;
} Locat ion ;
The Location data structure tracks the
current location and the system then incre-
ments the current location until it has gone
through all possible locations. If the sys-
tem were written recursively, then the state
would be kept track of by the recursive calls,
but it had to be done manually. The State
structure was used to store the state infor-
mation. It keeps track of the current Grid,
Path and Location. Additionally, the state
keeps track of the information about the to-
tal number of iterations and the number of
valid grids that occurred during those itera-
tions. This statistical information helps re-
searchers to understand the complexity and
the runtime of the system, when cracking
Latin squares.
Listing 4. State Structure
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typedef struct State {
Grid g r id ;
Locat ion l o c a t i o n ;
Path ∗ path ;
long count ;
long i t e r a t i o n s ;
}State ;
The State structure had to be created to
accommodate the problem of recursion in
CUDA on the GPU. The developer imple-
mented a State structure for every depth of
the search, such that backtracking to pre-
vious states could be accomplished. Every
time a valid grid was encountered, the sys-
tem saves the current state, and then clones
the entire state to the next depth. The al-
gorithm then increments the state and per-
forms a check to see if the current state can
be incremented. If it cannot be incremented,
the algorithm then pops states until it finds
one that can be incremented. If there are
none, then the algorithm has finished its
search.
5. METHODOLOGY
The hypothesis of this research was that the
OTG system leaked information with every
password generated. To prove this hypothe-
sis, we first needed to create a Latin square
and a set of DNP pairs. If the OTG sys-
tem leaked information, then we should see
a lower number of possible grids that would
need to be checked, compared to a brute at-
tack on all possible Latin squares.
The process we used to test the Off The
Grid system was to generate a randomly gen-
erated Latin square of size 10. A program
was developed that would chose a random
set of characters to represent a domain name
(repeat letters were omitted). For each do-
main name, the algorithm would locate the
starting point, by tracing the path of the
domain name in the Latin square as de-
scribed in Section 2.1. The algorithm would
then generate the password for each domain.
The output of this program was the 12,288
unique DNP pairs.
After the DNP pairs were generated, the
testing of the system could begin. Many
shell scripts were created to automate the
task of extracting a particular DNP pair and
then attacking it with the GPU password
cracking system described in Section 4. The
scripts would either 1) run that DNP pair
through the password cracking system or 2)
combine multiple DNP pairs and run them
through the password cracking system.
The password cracking system would gen-
erate a small amount of log information as
it ran. It would time how long the pro-
cess took, generate statistical information
and it could even verify that the original
grid was located at each depth of the search.
The statistical information collected would
count the number of possible grids that were
searched as well as the number of valid grids
at each depth. The verification that the orig-
inal grid was optional and it did not posi-
tively influence the algorithms performance
at any point.
For the tests that were run we used the
NVIDIA GeForce GTX 970 graphics cards.
A server was built using 4 graphics cards
connected via PCI. These cards fit in a 2U
server chassis, though further research shows
that 8 or more cards can be connected by us-
ing USB-to-PCIE convertors. The password
cracking system is designed to use one graph-
ics card at a time, though multiple instances
of the program can be run at the same time.
5.1 Single domain password
To verify that the password cracking system
was working correctly, all of the 12,288 DNP
pairs were run through the system. Fig-
ure 8 shows the number of possible grids
generated by each DNP pair. The smallest
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number of possible combinations was 8 and
the maximum was just less then 13 million.
The testing at this stage was to run all the
grids through the cracking system. The data
clearly shows a wide amount of variance be-
tween the number of possibility generated by
a DNP pair. One property of a Latin Square
is that you can rotate the square 90◦and the
properties of the square remain. Thus, only
1/4 of the grids are a result of the original
square. Thus, the smallest possible number
of grids that can be generated is 4. A result
of 8 shows that there are two possible grids
(each rotated 4 times).
Figure 8. 1 password, Number of Possible
Grids
Figure 9 shows another view of the data
generated for all 12,288 DNP. The filled por-
tion of the grids ranged from 11 to 19 percent
with 1 domain name password combination.
For a six character password, more than 90%
of the grids (11,104/12,288) yielded 16 char-
acter from the final grid while over 51%
(6,292/12,288) of DNP generated 18 or more
characters. This data shows that on aver-
age a 6 character password leaks 18 or more
characters of 100 characters in the grid.
5.2 Two domains
The data presented in Section single show
encouraging results. There is data leakage
for each password generated. Given that
Figure 9. 1 password, Percentage of Grid
Filled
there are 12,288 passwords generated for the
first stage, it would not be feasible to gener-
ate all possible grids pairs in a reasonable
time frame. For example an average grid
#10052 had 3,637,872 possible valid grids
and it took 13.96 seconds to run that sin-
gle test. When this is multiplied by every
possible grid that we could combine it with,
then the time to run all of these grids would
not be feasible at this time given the current
hardware in our lab. As the goal of this pa-
per is to pinpoint the uppermost bound on
the amount of data leaked by passwords en-
coded using this scheme, we opted for a more
targeted approach. The grids that produced
the smallest number of grids were combined
together as a set of 2 of DNP pairs.
By combining the smallest grids, the time
required to combine these DNP was mini-
mized. Each grid was combined with all
the other grids in the top 40 (excluding it-
self). The test generated 1560 (40x39) dif-
ferent sets of 2 grids that were combined,
and then ran through the password cracking
algorithm. The top 40 grids had between
8 and 88 different valid grids and the filled
percentage ranged from 11% to 15%.
Figure 10 shows the results from gener-
ating the possible grids for the combination
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of two of the top 40 smallest DNP poirs.
The number of valid grids ranged from 4 to
560. As the grids in this test run were much
smaller in size, the number of possible grids
had a much smaller variance than in the first
test.
Figure 10. 2 passwords, Number of Possible
Grids
Figure 11 shows the percentage of the grid
that is filled in the same data set. The per-
centage ranged from 13% to 28%. Again, we
can see that data is still being leaked by the
use of the OTG password system. The re-
sults of this test were quick and we could see
that running pairs of DNP through the al-
gorithm yielded more information than run-
ning a single DNP through the system.
Figure 11. 2 password, Percentage of Grid
Filled
Analysis was done on the top 40 smallest
grids, and the results were intuitive. The
constraints shown in Section 3, especially in
the wrapping situations yielded the small-
est grids. It is clear that if there is a wrap
around that occurs, then the resulting pass-
word yields a much smaller set of possible
grids than any other password. Thus these
passwords were weak, and they would shrink
down the state space involved. But, the
passwords that were in the top 40 would of-
ten combine not just 1 wrap around pass-
word, but often 2 or 3 of these in succession.
This would force the number of possible valid
grids to be very small.
5.3 Optimal Selection
The above approach did not yield a set of op-
timal results. Section 5.1 showed that for ev-
ery character in a 6 character domain name
we netted 3 characters worth of information
(51% of grids yielded 18 characters or more).
However, in Section 5.2 we saw that the max-
imum number of characters of information
leaked was 28. This means for the two DNP
pairs, we yielded 2.3 characters worth of in-
formation per character in the passwords.
This result is due to the selection of small
grids over optimal grids that would be com-
bined. The optimal set of grids to combine
would be grids that do not contain any over-
lap with one another. Then each grid would
yield the maximum amount of information
when run through the password cracking al-
gorithm.
To test our theory about selecting the op-
timal grids, a group of python programs were
written to extract the final grids from the log
information created by the password crack-
ing system. These scripts would get the final
grid’s output and then combine it with the
final output of other 12,287 grids.
Running the python script on pairs of
DNP pairs, the output resulted in over
48,000 combinations that yielded 38 char-
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acters when combined. This result shows
that if these DNP pairs would be combined,
then the for every character in the two do-
mains, we yield 3.166 characters of informa-
tion leaked. Running one of the optimal
pairs through our algorithm yielded the re-
sult in 1.5 days, running on a single graphics
card.
Another python script was created to at-
tempt to combine the results of combining
3 DNP pairs together. The results of the
script were narrowed down to print only the
grids that had more than 55 characters in
the grid. The data shows that more than
13,000 of the combined grids had either 56
or 57 characters filled in with the grid.
5.4 Estimation of Possible
Combined Grids
Following further analysis of the data, it was
found that one could estimate the number of
total grids that the GPU would have to check
for each password combination. To do so,
one would start by parsing the output and
obtaining the total grids checked and num-
ber of valid grids for each individual pass-
word in the desired combination. The com-
bination of 2 grids (Grid A and Grid B) is
performed by first computing valid grids for
Grid A and then computing all possible grids
that could occur for Grid B. A pessimistic es-
timate is to compute the valid grids for Grid
A, and then multiplying that by the possible
grids for Grid B. The computation is done
for Grid A -¿ Grid B and then in reverse
Grid B -¿ Grid A. The most accurate esti-
mate is the minimum of the two products.
For example, in Grid #1734, it was com-
puted that there were 80 possible valid grids
after computing a total of 6,688 possible
grids. In Grid #4773 there were 64 total pos-
sible valid after computing a total of 86,808
possible grids. When these two grids were
combined, our program computed an esti-
mate as shown above. The calculation is per-
formed both directions to extract the small-
est estimate. For this example, our program
would take (80 ∗ 86, 808) and (64 ∗ 6, 688)
to obtain our two estimations. The calcula-
tion of Grid #4773 followed by Grid#1734
(6,688 x 64) gave us the smaller estimation
of 428,032, so we considered it to be the most
accurate estimate for the combination of the
two grids.
Figure 12
A test of combining Grid #1734 with Grid
#4773 found that it checked an actual to-
tal of 162,244 grids. These calculations were
performed on the top 40 smallest grids. Each
top 40 grid was combined with every other
top 40 grid. We then calculated the ratio
of the actual findings with our estimation,
it showed that our approximation was gen-
erally an overestimation. In general, the ac-
tual number of grids checked was only 65%
of our estimate. Figure 12 shows the result
of running the algorithm on the top 40 grids.
This is ordered by the number of cells filled.
The graph includes grids filled from 15 to 28
cells in a 100 cell grid.
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5.5 Example Bounds on Filled
Grids
A Latin square that is filled more than 1/2
full can become fully solvable. We were able
to compute fillable squares given the state of
a Latin square. For example when the grids
#5601,#5939 and #4323 were combined, we
yielded a result of 57 unique cells in the Latin
square. By using an algorithm that checks
to see if a cell has only one possible value,
we were able to complete 96 cells in the grid.
This leaves 4 cells empty where there are two
different possible solutions.
- e a g i f b d - c
c g h a j e i b d f
f j d e h c g i b a
e a g h f j d c i b
g d j i c b a f e h
b f i c g d j h a e
d c e b a g h j f i
a i c j b h f e g d
- b f d e i c a - g
i h b f d a e g c j
6. RESULTS
The results of our password cracking system
showed promise, as we were able to leak in-
formation from the OTG Latin square used
to generate website passwords. The results
of running a single DNP pair through the
password system was very quick. The time
for a single run ranged from 0-16 seconds
with the average taking 4.4 seconds.
The results of combining two different
top 40 smallest possible grids resulted in
grids that only had 4 possible grids, which
is essentially one grid that is rotated 4
times. The average number of grids that
had to be checked with 2 small grids was
143,801. The minimum number of grids
checked was 25,884 and the maximum num-
ber was 559,504. The grid that resulted
in the maximum number (Grids #8016 and
#8273) took only 11 seconds to run and it
resulted in 23 of the cells in the grid being
filled. We also had a combination of Grids
#11 and #4797 yielded 25 filled cells with
the number of grids checked at 66,880.
Comparing the results from the above
two tests to the computed number of Latin
squares shows a stark difference. For all
possible Latin squares of size 10 there are
≈ 9.9x1036 possible Latin squares. We were
able to compute 25% of the grid using only
6.6 ∗ 105 computations. Thus if there were
two more edge case grids that were optimally
combined, 50% of the grid could be filled.
This could possibly allow for a grid to be
solved in about 1.2∗106 computations. This
is 30 orders of magnitude less than the total
number of Latin squares of size 10.
7. CONCLUSIONS
AND FUTURE WORK
Our hypothesis was that given a set of Do-
main Name Password pairs, it would be pos-
sible to gain information about the original
grid. We have created a set of constraints,
based on the design documents provided by
the creator of the Off The Grid, that can
be used to reduce the state space of pos-
sible Latin squares. We have implemented
several algorithms that represent and attack
the different facets of the OTG system. We
have given evidence that it is possible to re-
duce the amount of work required to crack
the Latin squares used in the OTG password
system. We believe that given the calcula-
tions shown in Section 6 we can see that it
is possible that the use of Latin squares as
a password generation scheme can be com-
promised given a small set of passwords. We
have shown that character in a domain name
generates about 3 characters of the original
Latin square. If we extrapolate this out to
a full size 26x26 (676 cells) Latin square it
would take about 19 domain name password
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pairs to fully crack an OTG system. (676 /
2 (fill 50% of grid) / 3 (3 characters per do-
main character) / 6 (6 character password)).
7.1 Security Considerations
Given the above evidence, we would not rec-
ommend using the OTG for generating pass-
words for websites. We have shown that
there are possible weaknesses in the system
that could allow the original grid to be re-
covered. In addition, there is not a method
that can be used to reset a single password if
the password is lost. The loss of passwords
occurs on a regular basis as security breaches
have increased considerably over the past
decade. Finally, OTG does not support mul-
tiple logins names for websites. There are
a variety of reasons for having multiple ac-
counts and the OTG system has no mecha-
nism for multiple logins. Additionally, stan-
dards like WebAuthn provide a much higher
level of security using asymmetric encryp-
tion.
7.2 Future Work
The first area we would like to pursue more
research, we would like to generate more
possible passwords to find more weak DNP
pairs. These weak DNP pairs can be used to
find a closer approximation to the theoret-
ical bounds that can be used to attack the
OTG system.
The second area of future research is the
integration of the entire process into one
seamless tool. Currently there is a CUDA
C Program that implements the parallel
password cracking attacks. There are Bash
scripts that parse the output of the password
cracking and produce CSV outputs which
can then be parsed and read using Excel.
Those results are then manually sorted and
used to create the next stage of computa-
tion. Additionally, for the optimal computa-
tion, we utilize Python scripts to combine
the grids to get a quick handle on which
combinations will yield grids the largest por-
tion of a grid to be filled, which is then
run through a Java program that finds con-
strained cells and fills them in. All of these
programs should be combined into 1 stream-
lined system to make the process seamless
and more efficient.
The third area of research is to expand the
size of the grids that we will do processing
on. Currently we used a size of grid where we
have an exact size on the number of possible
grids. We would like to expand the research
to attack grids of size 15, 20 and 26, where
26 is the ultimate goal of the research. This
may require additional hardware and modi-
fication of software. The password cracking
software is mostly written to accommodate
larger sizes of grids, but the generation of
an initial set of grids and the distribution
of those grids to blocks of cores depends on
the size of the input, the number of cores
on a GPU and the available RAM on those
GPU’s. This process would require some fine
tuning, but should be a straightforward task.
REFERENCES
Alliance, F. (2018, 05). Fido2 project.
https://fidoalliance.org/fido2/.
Retrieved 2018, from
https://fidoalliance.org/fido2/
Galloy, M. (2018, 04). Cpu vs gpu
performance. Retrieved 2018-04-17,
from http://michaelgalloy.com/
2013/06/11/
cpu-vs-gpu-performance.html
Gibson, S. (2018, 04). Off the grid.
Retrieved 2018-04-17, from https://
www.grc.com/offthegrid.htm
Hashcat. (2018-05). Hashcat, advanced
password recovery. Retrieved 2018-04,
from
https://hashcat.net/hashcat/
Page 14 c© 2019 ADFSL
Cracking the Off The Grid password solution CDFSL Proceedings 2019
NVIDIA. (2018-04). Gpu-accelerated
tensorflow. Retrieved 2018-05-01,
from
https://www.nvidia.com/en-us/
data-center/gpu-accelerated
-applications/tensorflow/
NVIDIA. (2018-05). Gpu-accelerated
gromacs. Retrieved 2018-05-06, from
https://www.nvidia.com/en-us/
data-center/gpu-accelerated
-applications/gromacs/
SSH Communications Security, I. (2018,
05). Ssh (secure shell). Retrieved
2018, from
https://www.ssh.com/ssh/
W3C. (2018, 05). Web authentication: An
api for accessing public key credentials
level 1. Retrieved 2018-05-06, from
https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/
W3C. (2019). Web of things. Retrieved
2019, from
https://www.w3.org/WoT/
Wikipedia. (2018a). Geforce 10 series.
Retrieved 2018-04-17, from
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
GeForce 10 series
Wikipedia. (2018b). Latin squares.
Retrieved 2018-04-17, from
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Latin square
Wikipedia. (2108, 05). Salt (cryptography).
Retrieved 2018-05, from
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Salt (cryptography)
YubiKey. (2018, 05). Web authentication:
An api for accessing public key
credentials level 1. Retrieved
2018-05-06, from
https://www.yubico.com/
A. APPENDIX 1.
RESULT OUTPUT
The top 40 smallest Domain Name Password
Pairs are shown in Table 1. Tables 2 and 3
show the results of combining pairs of 2 DNP
pairs from Table 1 with each other. These
tables only show the pairs that have only
a single unique result grid (4 possible grids
with rotation).
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Table 1. Top 40 Smallest Domain Name
Password Pairs
Grid Number Number Filled Valid
503 12 8
5419 12 8
4797 14 12
8179 12 16
11873 13 16
2954 13 24
5129 12 24
645 14 32
16 13 40
1978 13 40
2606 15 40
9839 14 40
11357 14 40
9159 14 44
758 13 48
1749 14 48
5581 13 48
8997 13 48
11181 13 48
8788 13 52
4648 15 56
4773 15 64
2430 11 72
11 13 80
933 14 80
1373 14 80
1582 13 80
1734 14 80
3143 14 80
5421 14 80
6221 13 80
6674 13 80
7409 12 80
8276 13 80
8016 14 84
1620 13 88
8064 12 88
8273 13 88
9347 13 88
10969 15 88
Table 2. Results combining Two Domain
Name Password pairs
Grids Filled Total Possible Valid
503-5419 20 42248 4
503-4797 21 27632 4
503-8179 24 31432 4
503-11873 20 44392 4
503-2954 19 25884 4
503-5129 21 30632 4
503-11181 21 66920 4
503-4648 24 64152 4
503-933 20 44324 4
503-1620 24 62312 4
503-10969 22 27232 4
5419-4797 16 29280 4
5419-2954 18 28260 4
5419-16 18 121920 4
5419-1978 18 121920 4
5419-758 17 46040 4
5419-1620 19 68880 4
4797-8179 22 51880 4
4797-11873 20 74680 4
4797-2954 17 46772 4
4797-5129 21 51560 4
4797-645 21 46820 4
4797-16 20 141440 4
4797-1978 20 141440 4
4797-9839 23 60128 4
4797-4648 21 85880 4
4797-11 25 66880 4
4797-933 21 57180 4
4797-1734 20 48604 4
4797-6674 21 79960 4
4797-8064 20 46820 4
4797-10969 20 47760 4
8179-16 24 270920 4
8179-1978 24 270920 4
8179-9347 20 30756 4
11873-2954 20 30132 4
11873-11181 18 95704 4
11873-1620 24 88680 4
11873-10969 22 34200 4
2954-5129 21 44844 4
8064-10969 22 92512 4
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Table 3. Results combining Two Domain
Name Password pairs Continued
Grids Filled Total Possible Valid
2954-16 19 213124 4
2954-1978 19 213124 4
2954-9839 21 107892 4
2954-4648 21 103684 4
2954-11 22 68724 4
2954-933 20 50184 4
2954-8064 20 27356 4
2954-10969 19 28524 4
5129-16 21 345440 4
5129-1978 21 345440 4
5129-10969 22 37200 4
645-10969 22 37744 4
16-11181 20 409008 4
16-4648 21 362800 4
16-1734 23 228624 4
16-1620 23 396880 4
16-10969 23 217840 4
1978-11181 20 409008 4
1978-4648 21 362800 4
1978-1734 23 228624 4
1978-1620 23 396880 4
1978-10969 23 217840 4
2606-8276 23 126640 4
9839-9159 20 230756 4
9839-8273 21 302316 4
9839-9347 21 183700 4
9839-10969 24 178636 4
9159-4648 21 182480 4
9159-10969 22 91520 4
758-1582 18 184792 4
1749-1734 24 77912 4
11181-11 24 179320 4
11181-933 19 123260 4
4648-1373 25 450960 4
4648-8273 22 282200 4
4648-9347 21 252144 4
4773-11 23 322288 4
2430-8273 20 160840 4
2430-9347 21 91424 4
3143-10969 22 112344 4
8016-8273 23 559504 4
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